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Thinking with Whitehead about Existential Risk 
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1. Thinking Existential Risk 
Nick Bostrom defines an existential risk as a threatened destructive event that would be global in 
scope and terminal in intensity, such that it “would either annihilate Earth-originating life or 
permanently and drastically curtail its potential” (2002: 1.2).1 He and other researchers associated 
with the Future of Humanity Institute (founded in 2005) argue that the topic has received 
scandalously little attention. They attribute this neglect to a number of factors, including the 
multidisciplinary nature of the problem (Bostrom 2013: 26), observation selection effects and other 
forms of cognitive bias such as “scope neglect” (Ćirković 2008; Yudkowksy 2008), the relative 
newness of many of the types of existential risk they identify, and, more generally, “an aversion 
against thinking seriously about a depressing topic” (Bostrom 2002: 2). Perhaps the strongest overall 
factor – and the greatest fundamental challenge for thinking about and addressing the risk of 
existential catastrophe – lies in the fact that, by default, we have never experienced or witnessed 
one. Thus, Bostrom emphasizes, given that “there is no opportunity to learn from failure,” the 
“reactive approach” must be abandoned in favour of a “proactive approach” when dealing with the 
threat of existential catastrophe. (2013: 27) 
In this paper, I take as read that existential risk, as well global catastrophic risks generally, 
demand our serious attention, and that they do indeed pose special or unique difficulties to 
attempts to think and address them. However, I also propose that the question of how we think 
about existential risks, in light of these special difficulties, is of fundamental importance, and that 
                                                            
1 References to this paper, originally published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, use its own internal 
numeration of sections in reference to the pdf and html formats in which it circulates online. The scheme was 
subsequently refined to indicate that an existential risk would have to be not only global, but trans- and pan-
generational, i.e. not only decimating humanity at the time of its occurrence, but destroying or terminally 
impairing all future human generations (see Bostrom and Ćircović 2008: 3 and Bostrom 2013: 17). 
this question is not fully answered by elaborations of the various cognitive biases that have had and 
could always have an effect on such thinking, despite the importance of reminders such as those 
provided by Yudkowsky (2008). 
Another way of putting Bostrom’s statement that there is no scope for a reactive approach 
in relation to existential risks is to say that there is no opportunity here for adaptive change (which 
in some contexts would be termed “evolution”) to take place. The difficulty we face is, in the 
conceptual vocabulary of Gregory Bateson, the impossibility not only of first-order learning by trial 
and error, but also of second-order learning, or “deutero-learning” (1972: 166-169). Because “error 
is always biologically and/or psychically expensive,” organisms reduce the amount of trial-and-error 
learning necessary by “learning to learn” more efficiently: “we (and all other biological systems) not 
only solve particular problems but also form habits which we apply to the solution of classes of 
problems,” allowing them to be “solved in terms of assumptions or premises, fewer in number than 
the members of the class of problems” (Bateson 1972: 274). The notion that existential risk demands 
a “proactive approach” could be re-stated in these terms: existential risk presents us with the 
challenge of learning how to acquire the adaptive effects of deutero-learning without the benefit of 
the first-order learning through which we have become accustomed to developing them – 
effectively, a problem of third-order learning.  
Meeting such a challenge can be expected to entail the kinds of capacities, acquired through 
millennia of deutero-learning, that are often discussed as autonomous properties of human thought 
or mind (abstract reasoning, reflective intelligence, deductive and inductive logic, and so on). Yet it 
should also entail a certain wariness of the habits such properties entail, as well as the dangers of 
leaving out other facets of mind acquired by feedback loops such as intuition, feeling, and 
unconscious modes of engagement with the world. As Bateson puts it, part of the efficacy of those 
hard-programmed analytic and cognitive habits often taken to be essential to learning depends upon 
a kind of meta-habit of not examining them (1972: 274). The FHI approach to existential risk seeks to 
jolt us out of one meta-habit of not considering the (human-caused) end of humanity as a problem 
that needs addressing – in the process asking us to re-examine other psychological biases affecting 
the way we think (or do not think) about this issue. Here I want to ask whether this approach, 
heuristically valuable though it may be, introduces its own set of potentially restrictive biases, to the 
neglect of other modes of thinking that might be valuable to the challenge of addressing existential 
risk. Primarily, I want to explore what gains, if any, there may be from considering existential risk 
through the lens of a process-based metaphysics such as Alfred North Whitehead’s. 
This is an experiment, and as such is not undertaken with any sure expectation of success. At 
the same time, it is, of course, not an exercise undertaken arbitrarily. There are a number of reasons, 
intuitively at least, for thinking that Whitehead – who describes the lectures which compose Process 
and Reality as an attempt not only to provide a coherent metaphysical system, but also to repudiate 
certain prevalent philosophical habits of thought – might be helpful in this context.2  
To begin with, at the broadest level, we might anticipate that a process-based framework 
would be particularly well-suited to any attempt to establish the criteria for the occurrence of events 
of a certain class and their complex relationships to prior events. My hope is that Whitehead’s 
conceptual scheme and vocabulary may help address some concerns I have about the downplaying 
of the processual dimension of risk and catastrophe effected by the categorial and probability-based 
schema of Bostrom. At the same time, Whitehead’s enterprise is ultimately underpinned by what he 
terms a rationalist “adventure of hope” – the faith that there are no elements in experience that are 
not “intrinsically capable of exhibition as examples of general theory” (PR: 42) – placing it, at least 
broadly, within the same rational spirit that informs current and recent thinking on existential risk.3 
On this basis, we may have at least initial cause to hope that such a speculative philosophy would be 
                                                            
2 Among the “nine myths and fallacious procedures” in Whitehead’s list, probably most relevant here are the 
habitual “distrust of speculative philosophy,” the “trust in language as an adequate expression of 
propositions,” and the “belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than some antecedent 
errors” (PR: xiii). References to Process and Reality are indicated throughout by the initials PR followed by a 
page number. 
3 Cf. Whitehead: “Rationalism is an adventure in the clarification of thought, progressive and never final. But it 
is an adventure in which even partial success has importance” (PR: 9). 
of value in attempting to explore an area in which uncertainty must be accepted and respected as 
fundamental – the consideration of necessarily future and unprecedented events – yet in which 
greater accuracy of understanding is nevertheless urgently desired and sought.  
 
2. The Becoming of Existential Risks 
Thinking about existential risks is necessarily a speculative undertaking. But there are many different 
ways of being speculative, and the very conditions of a problem that requires speculation seem to 
point to the value of trying different modes, while exercising our best intuitive and intellectual 
estimations as to which might bear fruit. 
The particular speculative mode developed by Bostrom and taken up by a number of other 
thinkers of existential risk begins with the attempt to categorize types of existential risk (within a 
more general categorial scheme of types of risk). This then forms the basis for making judgments 
about the probability of the (primarily near-future) occurrence of these types of risk, and for thinking 
about ways of lowering these probabilities. This approach has clear heuristic value in establishing 
existential risks as not only demanding, but also amenable to calculation, analysis, and planning in 
ways that may conceivably translate into pragmatic policy-making and other forms of collective 
preventive action. 
This may well be a viable direct route to locating existential risks within the spheres of 
research and policy we can reasonably deem most likely to have a chance of mitigating them. Yet it 
nevertheless encourages us to neglect certain aspects of possible existential catastrophes – primarily 
their processual character – in ways that I would suggest could be to the detriment of attempts to 
address them in the long run. Experimenting with restoring this processual dimension by describing 
existential catastrophe and existential risk in Whiteheadian terms is not a matter of “correcting” an 
oversight: there is nothing in Bostrom’s schema that takes any aspect of reality to have a 
fundamentally non-processual mode of existence. Rather, the worry is that this schema lends itself 
to ways of thinking that tend to bracket or neglect the processual, a reduction that is commonplace 
and efficacious in many contexts of everyday and scientific thinking, but which can on certain points 
have a nontrivial effect. Identifying and seeking to recover the nontrivial losses in this reduction is 
the first aim of the following redescription of existential catastrophe and risk in Whiteheadian terms. 
Henri Bergson, another process metaphysician, often referred to this kind of reduction as a 
“spatialization” of what are more aptly considered temporal aspects of reality. Whenever we treat 
something of a temporal or processual character as though it were divisible into homogeneous units 
– whether implicitly in thought and language, or with the aid of diagrammatic forms that represent 
time as a spatial dimension – we spatialize it. Whitehead agrees with Bergson that spatialization is 
reductive, in that it promotes an analysis of the world “in terms of static categories,” even as it is 
simultaneously “the shortest route to a clear-cut philosophy expressed in reasonably familiar 
language” (PR: 209). In many cases and contexts, this reduction can be considered irrelevant or 
trivial. But whether as a direct impetus or indirect influence, the spatializing habit can have a 
nontrivial effect on attempts to understand the fundamental nature of reality, or any aspect of 
reality in which this fundamental nature is at stake: “The simple notion of an enduring substance 
sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many 
purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it 
proves itself mistaken” (PR: 79). Bostrom’s categorial and typological framework provides a “useful 
abstract” in this sense, but should not be taken as a “fundamental statement of the nature” of the 
things in question. 
Let us try the experiment of putting existential risk and catastrophe in Whiteheadian terms. 
At the heart of Whitehead’s metaphysics is what he refers to as the “concrescence” of “actual 
entities”. Anything conceivable as a singular unit or object, any Cartesian res vera (PR: xiii) can, in 
Whiteheadian terms, be considered an actual entity or an actual occasion.4 The reason Whitehead 
uses the terms “entity” and “occasion” interchangeably is that an actual entity “exists” only at the 
moment its concrescence is “satisfied” – that is, the moment it is realised by or in relation to some 
other entity as an entity or thing: it is already passing out of being at the moment of this satisfaction, 
which is only identifiable in relation to it. Given that actual entities are the basic units or things of 
Whitehead’s universe, anything conceived as having some reality from a human perspective – 
anything we are likely to treat as a thing, entity or occasion in the more everyday senses of these 
terms – is likely to consist in Whiteheadian terms, as a collection or convergence of many different 
actual entities. Perhaps in implicit recognition of this fact, Whitehead reserves a separate 
terminology for such a collection, referring to it as a “nexus” or “society”: “In our reference to the 
actual world, we rarely consider an individual actual entity. The objects of our thoughts are almost 
always societies, or looser groups of actual entities” (PR: 198). A molecule, for example, must be 
“some kind of nexus of actual occasions” (PR: 73). The same applies to a person. To the extent that 
we conceive of a person as having consistence over time (and, indeed, to the extent that they do 
have some such consistence or persistence, regardless of our perception or conception of them) as 
somehow being the same “person” at one moment after another, and having done so throughout 
their lifetime, we are considering a nexus. This kind of nexus – as e.g. a persistent object or person – 
is for Whitehead a “society,” in that the actual entities – or subordinate nexuses – which constitute it 
are related by a “social order,” e.g. by which one cell in a body is replaced by a cell of a 
corresponding type, or by which organs and mental activities continue to interact in such a way as to 
refer to or prehend a particular body or person that is, through this prehension, grasped as the same 
from one moment to the next, day by day and year by year.5 
                                                            
4 Cf. Whitehead: “The actual entity never moves: it is where it is and what it is. In order to emphasize this 
characteristic by a phrase connecting the notion of ‘actual entity’ more closely with our ordinary habits of 
thought, I will also use the term ‘actual occasion’ in the place of the term ‘actual entity’” (PR: 73). On the one 
exception to this equivalence, see note 10 below. 
5 Social order corresponds to “that complex character in virtue of which a man is considered to be the same 
enduring person from birth to death” (PR: 90).  
Since both existential risk and existential catastrophe are complex phenomena (whether 
considered from a metaphysical or anthropic perspective), I will use these terms (nexus, society) to 
describe them here. However, the fundamental metaphysical relationship between concrescence 
and actual entity/occasion gives us the fundamental structure involved in a process-oriented 
approach: anything constituted, recognized or perceived as a particular “thing” is what it is only as 
the realization of a process, a becoming, and not as having some static or eternal existential status 
outside of this process.  
 
 
For any putative existential catastrophe – say, the result of an impact event between our 
planet and another astronomical object – even if we limit our attention to those aspects of the 
impact with a direct destructive effect on human life, we treat it as a nexus of occurrences ordered 
by their common relation to the occasion of the impact. This type of nexus is what Whitehead terms 
an “event.”6 The continued existence of the impacting object itself, over time (as of the Earth, or any 
organism or object whatsoever) would be a nexus of the “social” type; and the nexus which included 
its position and trajectory relative to Earth prior to the collision would of course be one societal 
nexus particularly pertinent to any attempt to prevent the impact (though, likewise, one could 
consider the nexus of its salient effects, including powerful winds, shock waves, thermal 
intensification, tsunamis, earthquakes, all of which could be analysed further as societies with 
subordinate nexuses and societies, down to the molecular level, or equally to the biographical level 
of their effects on groups of human and non-human societal nexuses). 
We could in theory extend our description to infinitesimal degrees in these terms. What I 
want to point to is that, for any putative existential catastrophe – for an astronomical impact event 
                                                            
6 “I shall use the term ‘event’ in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some 
determinate fashion in one extensive continuum. An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event with only 
one member” (PR: 73). 
as much as for a terrorist attack using nanotechnology, or a nuclear holocaust – there is a societal 
nexus corresponding to the process of which it is the posited outcome. There are some species of 
existential catastrophe for which this would be largely irrelevant to us – e.g. the scenario described 
by Bostrom in which it turns out we are living in a simulation, and those running it decide to shut it 
down (Bostrom 2002: 4.3; 2003). But for most of the species of existential catastrophe in whose 
culminating process we might hope to intervene, it is the nexus or society of its coming-to-be that is 
likely to be most worth our attention. 
This nexus or society can be understood as the material or actual set of processes – 
consisting in subordinate nexuses and others within those, to whatever degree of detail we find it 
helpful to try to identify them – corresponding to any particular estimation of an existential risk. 
That is, estimating the probability of an existential risk can be considered an estimation of the 
likelihood that one such nexus exists, is in process, towards its eventual satisfaction. Attending to 
this nexus, seeking to locate it, speculating as to and seeking out its components and their advance, 
would be the operation of an attempt in these terms to mitigate a given species of existential 
catastrophe.  
Bostrom and others’ identification of existential catastrophe and risks as particular events, 
amenable to categorization and probabilistic calculation, has heuristic value in calling for attention 
to, and beginning to search for advantageous ways to develop mitigating strategies against them.  
However, such an approach simultaneously (if inadvertently) encourages us to think about given 
existential catastrophes in binaristic or atomistic terms, as possibilities which will either come to be 
the case or not, in a manner which risks diverting our attention away from the processes by which 
this might occur, and which make their probabilities dynamic over time.  
One retort to this might be that it should be perfectly reasonable to expect us to be able to 
employ probabilistic thinking and more concrete, process-sensitive analysis respectively in their 
proper contexts. That is, we should be able to apply the former in contexts where we are concerned 
with the concept and likelihood of existential risk(s), and the latter in contexts where we are more 
concerned with intervening in factors that seem to be converging to increase the probability of some 
specific existential catastrophe occurring. I would suggest, however, that this would be an extremely 
difficult distinction to maintain in any sustained way.  Not all of the feedback loops that go into the 
development of our thinking and reasoning (indeed, not even the majority of them) are conscious – 
and neither, indeed, are the relevant factors affecting either our own or nonhuman decisions for the 
realization of some particular nexus such as a given existential catastrophe. It is neither mystical nor 
irrational to recognize that an invocation to base our evaluations on “reasons rather than untutored 
intuition” (Bostrom 2002: 4.3) can only ever be met in part, and should only be pursued as far as 
there is useful scope for acting on the basis of reason alone. 
Let me offer an example of an area in which I think the probabilistic approach of the 
prevalent thinking on existential risk – that is, this tendency to encourage an approach which would 
lead us, consciously or unconsciously, into the habit of treating existential catastrophes as atomistic 
events isolated from the processes of their coming-to-be, rather than nexuses – can cause problems 
that might be addressed by the supplement of a more process-based approach.  
A recurrent feature of discussions of existential risk to date is the drawing of relatively firm 
distinctions between terminal and non-terminal global catastrophic risks. This is a virtually inevitable 
result of Bostrom’s proposal to categorize risks by type, according to discrete levels (rather than 
gradations) of intensity or scope. This might seem to be assuaged by the way existential risk is 
included within the larger category of global catastrophic risk, rather than set apart as a wholly 
independent category. In Bostrom’s original schema (2002: 1.1), there are risks that are considered 
global but non-terminal (endurable), such as the thinning of the ozone layer, and terminal risks that 
are not considered global, such as genocide: a putative catastrophe would have to be both global 
and terminal to be placed in the existential risk category. In a later, revised scheme (Bostrom and 
Ćirković 2008: 3; 2013: 17), the global category has been further subdivided to include categories of 
risk that are trans- and pan-generational, and the “terminal” category has been replaced with 
“crushing.” On the one hand, this revision indicates a sensitivity to the range of possible catastrophic 
events that have a non-negligible chance of occurring, and the fact that a catastrophe can be 
devastating for large portions of humanity without qualifying as existential. On the other hand, 
however, it functions to reinforce the “special” status of existential risks and the sense that, 
however great another catastrophe might be, an existential catastrophe should always be of 
massively greater concern. This is also reflected in the edited collection of essays Global Catastrophic 
Risks (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), where the editors recognize the sensitivity (and controversy) 
surrounding the question of how much worse an existential risk should be considered compared to a 
non-existential global catastrophic risk, broadening their scope in order to “lay a broader foundation 
of systematic thinking about big risks in general” (2008: 4). Nevertheless, the core of the approach 
remains that “existential risks share a number of features that mark them out as deserving of special 
consideration” (2008: 4). 
An argument that has been used repeatedly to emphasize the greater importance of 
existential risks over others is Derek Parfit’s reasoning that the difference between a nuclear war 
that destroyed 100% of humans, and one that destroyed 99%, would be far greater than the 
difference between the nuclear war that destroyed 99% and the avoidance of such a war altogether. 
(That is, the survival of a tiny number of humans with the potential to propagate the species into the 
future is infinitely preferable to the survival of none.) This is based on the reasoning that the 
eradication of 100% of humanity should be taken to include all possible future generations, whereas 
the eradication of 99% would not. This sets up an oppositional relationship between existential and 
non-existential risks: “One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential 
risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ‘ordinary’ good, such as 
the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives” (Bostrom 2013: 19). 
This kind of reasoning, often couched in terms of utilitarianism, also involves a degree of 
game theory, whereby the value assigned to a smaller quantity of lives, e.g. 1 billion, is much smaller 
than that assigned to a much larger quantity, e.g. 1016 (Bostrom 2013: 18), thus making sacrificing 
the former to preserve the latter ethically preferable to preserving the former at the (possible 
eventual) expense of the latter. However, while there may be no urgent need to refute this in 
theory,7 its application in practice would depend on the emergence of conditions in which this 
binaristic choice could be actualized. Whether and how likely such conditions are to emerge seems 
to me much more open to question. Furthermore, the possible argument that even situations in 
which this seemed to be a binary choice would require us to act for the greater good, given the 
stakes, are suspect, given the extent to which actions taken in the name of the greater good have 
throughout human history led to the destruction of life on massive scales, and could thus at least as 
easily be expected to contribute to an existential catastrophe as mitigate one. 
While situations can be conceived in which these conditions are met – such as Bostrom’s 
imagining of a “rogue state” scenario in which a preemptive strike against a sovereign nation is 
necessary to prevent it causing an existential catastrophe (2002: 9.3) – it seems likely that for most 
varieties of existential risk, there is a good chance that many non-crushing global catastrophes could 
form part of the nexus constituting the coming-to-be of a particular existential catastrophe. A 
straightforward example would be global warming. Bostrom gives the thinning of the ozone layer as 
an instance of an endurable (i.e. non-existential) global catastrophic risk. But this delineation can 
only be made after the fact: had the “ozone hole” not been recognized and made the target of direct 
                                                            
7 There are many grounds for at least questioning this reasoning, or at least the degree of difference derived 
from it between the destruction of human lives on massive contemporary versus pan-generational scales. For 
example, the inclusion of all potential future generations within the calculation of the number of lives 
destroyed seems to presume that no other factor intervenes in the near future to prevent the appearance of 
those 1016 lives. In another vein, to suggest that the destruction of a potential future life is equivalent in value 
to the destruction of an extant life is dangerously close to arguments that equate abortion with killing – and 
could even be taken to imply that all of us have an ethical duty to procreate as much as possible. However, I 
see no reason to disagree in absolute terms with the idea that a pan-generational catastrophe would be 
considerably worse than one affecting a more limited (though great) number of lives: the concern here is how 
one determines one or the other in advance to be an outcome of particular circumstances or actions, and what 
actions this is then used to support or justify.    
global action in the 1980s, or had the Montreal Protocol not succeeded, the production of ozone-
depleting chemicals might have been the primary factor in the occurrence of an existential 
catastrophe. While it is correct that a short-term thinning of the ozone layer can be considered 
endurable, while a longer-term erosion, within certain quantifiable parameters, would be crushing 
or terminal for humanity, placing them on opposing sides of a categorial line encourages us to think 
them in opposition, neglecting the way in which each is implicated within the other: an existential 
ozone-depletion catastrophe arises out of a non-existential one, and addressing the latter reduces 
the risk of the occurrence of the former.  
For other species of existential risk, the possible relations are likely to be much more 
complicated, but still in ways that I think the categorial approach may encourage us to neglect. For 
example, the “rogue state” scenario, or one arising from the “deliberate misuse of nanotechnology” 
to “eat up the biosphere or destroy it by other means such as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking 
out the sunlight” (Bostrom 2002: 4.1) could be considered a societal nexus partially constituted by 
numerous prior global catastrophes whose mitigation might have led to its avoidance.  In this 
hypothetical scenario, it seems highly plausible that, as is the case with many historical acts of 
terrorism, those behind the deliberate misuse of nanotechnology might be responding to certain 
geopolitical conditions of injustice and inequality: these might include military invasions and 
conflicts, widespread poverty, the uneven global distribution of the effects of climate change – all 
enabled or permitted by other human institutions and powers with the capacity to intervene. 
Furthermore, it should be possible to identify a number of putative existential catastrophes which, 
though differing in kind, might include these diverse global catastrophes as significant elements 
within their concrescence. There are likely to be many non-terminal global catastrophic risks that 
would constitute elements in the nexus of a number of putative existential catastrophes in 
formation. It would, therefore, make sense to direct attention towards identifying and addressing 
these, and viewing this not as a subtraction of resources and attention from the putative actual 
entities that constitute given putative existential catastrophes, but as part of the wider challenge of 
addressing existential risks.  
This may seem, from the prevalent existential risk perspective, to advocate what Bostrom 
denigrates as frittering away altruism on “a plethora of feel-good projects of sub-optimal efficacy” 
(2013: 19). There are several reasons in addition to the above for suggesting this is not (or at least 
not necessarily) the case, and that there are additional benefits to the task of reducing at least some 
species of existential risk, direct and indirect, in tackling such global ethical challenges as world 
poverty, health, poor living conditions, environmental damage, social inequality, military conflict, 
and other non- or not-yet-existential threats.  
For one thing, as Bostrom notes, addressing many species of existential risk is likely to 
require a lot of advocates and resources. He thus expresses the hope that “some of the global 
movements that emerged over the last half century – in particular the peace movement, the 
environmentalist movement, and various global justice and human-rights movements – will 
increasingly take on board more generalised concerns about existential risk” (2013: 27). Surely 
recruiting the voices, efforts, and resources of those committed to such movements is likely to be 
facilitated by including the challenges of those various forms of global catastrophe in which their 
primary interests reside, as part of, rather than in competition with, the challenge of addressing 
existential risk. The notion of asking activists and oppressed groups to set aside their primary 
concerns in favour of the “greater good” that is the survival of humanity as a whole seems to me not 
only politically or ethically unjustifiable, but also hopelessly impractical – especially given that, for 
many such groups it is precisely the struggle over who or what counts as “human”, and who is 
viewed as representative of humanity that is at stake.8 
Secondly, while some form of game theory might eventually come into play, depending on 
the probability and type of existential risk in question, there is and will continue to be a great degree 
                                                            
8 See Sylvia Wynter (2003) for an extended account of the epistemology and politics of what she sees as the 
ongoing struggle in modernity between the ethnoclass “Man” and humanity as a species. 
of ignorance shrouding all thinking about future risk, regardless of the partial achievements of 
efforts to pierce it. For this reason there must be some ethical value in the intuitive judgment that 
any kind of suffering on a mass scale is not only worth addressing in itself, but also as a possible 
precursor of a more totalizing existential catastrophe. Bateson developed his thinking on deutero-
learning in complementary response to a paper by Margaret Mead, in which she advocated that 
researchers work “in terms of values which are limited to defining a direction” rather than towards 
“defined ends” (quoted in Bateson: 159). It seems to me that such a “directional” approach must at 
least be part of our thinking of and approach to existential risk, such that any kind of global 
catastrophe should at least be evaluated as a potential element in a putative future existential 
catastrophe. There would, of course, equally be much danger in making this a fixed law or 
presumption, and it could promote the very kinds of biased judgment that Bostrom and Yudkowsky 
(2008), for example, want us to avoid. But we may bear various forms of cognitive bias in mind and 
look for them in our thinking without abandoning intuition altogether.  
Finally, and perhaps most simply, even if we identify it as a reasonable probability that a 
number of global catastrophic risks are not going to play a part in the later occurrence of an 
existential catastrophe, there is arguably even greater reason to see some of these as potential 
elements in the development of situations that would be worse than the actualization of an 
existential risk. Bostrom includes such scenarios in his categorial scheme under the designation 
“hellish.” Examples of scenarios that could be considered worse than the eradication of humanity 
include “permanent and extreme forms of slavery or mind control” (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008: 4), 
“horrible incurable diseases” (Bostrom 2013: 28), and extreme, permanent totalitarian regimes. As 
Bryan Caplan notes, “it is tempting to minimize the harm of a social disaster like totalitarianism, 
because it would probably not lead to human extinction… But perhaps an eternity of totalitarianism 
would be worse than extinction” (2008: 517). 
At the very least, all of this would seem to point to the value and efficacy of addressing 
global catastrophic risk holistically in such a way as to include its existential and non-existential 
varieties. Nothing in the categorial and probabilistic scheme of Bostrom and others directly opposes 
this, and indeed, there are moments at which it is advocated. This may be taken as manifest in the 
decision to publish a book on global catastrophic risk rather than existential risk, for example. 
However, to the extent that the latter ultimately comes across as a book on existential risk with 
some attention paid to the other sub-categories of global catastrophic risk, and to the extent that 
notions which seem to oppose this special category to others crop up repeatedly in discussions of 
the topic, the mode of thinking that underpins them seems to bring with it the kinds of risks I have 
pointed to above. 
Whitehead’s system and vocabulary are of course not the only way to get to this position. 
However, I would suggest that by encouraging us to think carefully about the relation between being 
and becoming – in putting us within a certain process-sensitive mindset – they begins to affect the 
way we think about a given phenomenon or subject, such as existential risk, in subtle but potentially 
important ways. Beyond this, the detail of the conceptual vocabulary with which Whitehead 
develops his metaphysics, and which I have barely touched on thus far, offers great scope for more 
careful description of particular putative or potential existential threats in processual terms, should 
the attempt be deemed worthwhile.  
 
3. Technoscientific Bias and Non-scientific Resources: Propositions 
Before concluding, I would like to consider from another angle, but one also partially informed by 
Whitehead, the special problems existential risk poses to being thought.  
I noted in the introduction to this paper that Bostrom posits an “aversion” to thinking about 
such a depressing topic as one of the reasons so little attention has been directed to the possible 
occurrence of existential catastrophes. A possibly related factor, highlighted by Yudkowsky (2008: 
105-7), is “scope neglect.” This is the phenomenon whereby people treat a small number of negative 
occurrences (e.g. deaths) as though they were worse than a much larger number. Such thinking (or 
feeling) was expressed by Kurt Tucholsky, among others, in attributing to an imagined French 
diplomat the following statement: “The death of one person: that’s a catastrophe. A hundred 
thousand deaths: that’s a statistic” 9 (1932: 148). 
Among speculations as to the reasons for this bias, which has been documented in a number 
of psychological experiments, Yudkowsky cites a common saying in this field of study, that “people 
do not evaluate events, but descriptions of events” (2008: 114). This should prompt us to consider 
the implications of the particular conditions underpinning the Bostrom/FHI mode of describing 
existential risk in comparison to other such modes. The hypothesis of this paper thus far has been 
that describing large catastrophes in terms of their probability within a categorial scheme of risk has 
nontrivially different effects on the way we evaluate it compared to a more process-sensitive mode 
of description (many of these effects being heuristically valuable, but a few giving possible cause for 
concern). Other modes of describing occurrences that threaten the extinction of humanity, as found 
in the many narratives constructed on the theme in mythology, religion, literature and other media, 
will have different conditions and implications for the ways we evaluate them. Yudkowsky, in fact, 
highlights this sphere, though primarily, it seems, in order to associated it with flawed thinking, 
when he suggests that “the cliché phrase end of the world invokes the magisterium of myth and 
dream, of prophecy and apocalypse, of novels and movies” (2008: 114). Faced with prospects of 
destruction on scales that literally transcend their capacity for understanding and rationality – “the 
brain cannot multiply by 6 billion” (Yudkowsky 2008: 115) – humans turn to the sphere of the 
transcendent to look for ways to deal with them. This turn to the transcendent is generally seen as a 
hindrance or distraction within research emerging from the FHI. The prevalent existential risk 
                                                            
9 There are many versions of this expression: a very similar statement is commonly (possibly apocryphally) 
attributed to Joseph Stalin, while Yudkowsky (2008: 106) cites Hungarian physiologist Albert Szent-Györgi’s 
statement that “I am unable to multiply one man’s suffering by a 100 million.”  
approach represented by Bostrom et al seeks to bring existential catastrophe back within the 
immanent realm of thinkability by developing means of rendering it calculable and amenable to 
analysis, and exposing the cognitive biases that form obstacles to this enterprise. However, we might 
also wonder whether wholly avoiding this recourse to the transcendent is either possible or 
desirable as part of the challenge of mitigating existential risk.  
There is a clear techno-scientific bias in existential risk thinking to date, manifest first of all in 
the general position that the kinds of existential risks with which it is principally concerned are new 
to human history, dating roughly from the appearance of the possibility of global nuclear war in the 
mid-twentieth century (Bostrom 2002: 2). This effectively brackets out from the category of 
significant existential risks any perceived threats to the survival of humanity that have arisen in past 
religious and mythological contexts, such as large-scale floods, earthquakes, volcanoes and the 
divine agencies often taken to be behind them. But such a dismissal would seem to run counter to 
Bostrom’s own recognition, in justifying the speculative dimension of his own approach, that: “If we 
don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The 
subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on” (2002: 2, emphasis in original). 
Nevertheless, the result is that past cultural responses to such risks are effectively ruled out as 
potentially useful resources for facing current and future challenges of existential risk, even if 
Bostrom recognizes that religious responses may not have been “unreasonable” within their 
historical cultural contexts (2013: 29, note 35). This bias is underscored in the list of possible 
“general improvements” Bostrom hopes may increasingly help mitigate existential risk: 
“developments in educational techniques and online collaboration tools, institutional innovations 
such as prediction markets, advances in science and philosophy, spread of rationality culture, and 
biological cognitive enhancement” (2013: 28). While it is reasonable to assume that techniques such 
as “sacrificial offerings, persecution of witches or infidels, and so forth” (2013: 29, note 35) are 
unlikely to be of much use in facing existential risk in the future, to regard superstition-based ritual 
as the only potential resource to be found in such contexts (or to dismiss such contexts on the basis 
that they include such elements) seems needlessly restrictive.  
How might we envisage an approach that would be neither exclusively rationalist in this 
way, nor limited to impractically superstitious responses to the transcendent dimension of 
existential risk? That is, how might we go about rejecting or overcoming the apparent dichotomy of 
immanence and transcendence that this opposition implies, and which is found widely in modern 
thought (often manifest in excessive rationalism or scientism on the one hand, and dogmatic or 
obscurantist mysticism on the other)?  
Whitehead’s conception of God may initially seem to offer one prospect of addressing this 
problem. Despite being undertaken, as noted above, as a rationalist adventure, seeking to provide a 
descriptive system adequate to both objective and subjective experience as part of a single 
extensive continuum (like Bergson, Whitehead rejects a dominant opposition in nineteenth century 
philosophy between realism and idealism, anticipating later philosophers of immanence such as 
Gilles Deleuze and François Laruelle), Whitehead’s metaphysics nevertheless has room for a God 
who/that is essentially not religious. However, the primary functions of Whitehead’s God seem to be 
in enabling the creative advance of all existence, and in preserving or “saving” all that, by virtue of its 
processual coming-to-be, must also pass out of existence.10 For this reason, it is arguably of little 
value in any endeavour concerned with affecting or (re)directing the direction or historical unfolding 
of specific situations as they impinge upon the human. Thus for help in addressing the question of 
existential risk, we must turn elsewhere.  
 
                                                            
10 These are the respective functions, in summary form, of the two dimensions of Whitehead’s God: a 
“primordial nature” constituting “the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality” 
(PR: 343); and a “consequent nature” corresponding to the “realization of the actual world” (PR: 345), by 
which God constitutes the unity of all actual entities as they pass, “sav[ing] the world as it passes into the 
immediacy of his own life.” (PR: 346) 
Of greater value to the challenge of thinking about existential risk, I think, is Whitehead’s 
discussion of propositions. For Whitehead, a proposition “is the unity of certain actual entities in 
their potentiality for forming a nexus” (PR: 24). The notion of attempting to address existential risks 
by postulating or trying to identify the nexus-in-formation that may be leading in the direction of a 
given existential catastrophe, contributing to or constituting its coming-to-be, as described in the 
previous section, could be described as a propositional mode. Whitehead terms the constitutive 
actual entities of a proposition its “logical subjects”, while definite eternal objects (for example, the 
principle that humanity can come to an end, the fact of the passing or perishing of all actual entities, 
the potential for this or that mode of destruction) are its predicates. In this sense, a proposition has 
actuality in the actual entities it involves, as well as in the actual entity in which its thought or 
expression consists, and yet can still be the basis of logical or theoretical speculation in the senses in 
which philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers more commonly use the term. As Whitehead puts 
it, “a proposition is a new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities” 
(PR: 185-6). 
Whitehead is critical, however, of the logic-centred philosophical approach to propositions 
that has treated them purely in terms of true/false expressions, geared towards the making of 
judgments. “The main function of propositions in the nature of things” he writes, is not to facilitate 
belief, “but for feeling at the physical level of unconsciousness. They constitute a source for the 
origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum. A proposition is ‘realized’ by a member 
of its locus, when it is admitted into feeling” (PR: 186). In terms of this distinction, the prevalent 
mode of discussing existential risk can hitherto be said to have been propositional in the narrower 
sense – seeking to establish the basis for making yes/no or true/false judgments and logical, 
calculable estimations of probability. If, however, we appreciate the value of propositions in 
Whitehead’s sense, then we may look for propositions relevant to the challenge of thinking and 
addressing existential risk in the kinds of places that the probabilistic existential risk approach tends 
to exclude as irrelevant and/or irrational: in mythology, religion, intuition, literary, and other media 
and narrative modes – Yudkowsky’s separate “magisterium of myth and dream, prophecy and 
apocalypse, novels and movies.” After all, there is no reason for seeing such “unscientific” realms as 
incapable of constituting useful resources (intellectual, affective, or otherwise) for thinking and 
addressing existential risk – any more than we would expect to find scientific or analytic thought and 
discourse free of either cognitive bias or speculation. 
The propositions found in such cultural resources concerned with threats to humanity, from 
Atrahasis and other ancient flood myths to J. G. Ballard’s The Drowned World, from Plato’s Timaeus 
to The Planet of the Apes, may well all turn out to be “non-conformal” to the actual world of an 
entity concerned with it, rather than “conformal” (“non-conformal” and “conformal” being 
Whitehead’s adaptations of “false” and “true”). It is quite likely that none will conform fully to the 
nexus of a given existential catastrophe (though by the time we knew this it would be too late, from 
a human-survival-oriented point of view, for it to matter); there is, however, plenty of scope for 
thinking that the propositions found in such loci might conform to some or other element in the 
actuality of existential risk, as the thinking, feeling, acting in relation to the possibility of such 
catastrophes – and that they may therefore be of value to attempts to shape or affect these 
responses and approaches. Even so, in contrast to the way propositions are deployed in a standard 
mathematical or logical treatise (such as Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica), even 
failing to conform to actuality would not render a proposition without value within this broader 
perspective:  
 
The conception of propositions as merely material for judgments is fatal to any 
understanding of their role in the universe. In that purely logical aspect, non-conformal 
propositions are merely wrong, and therefore worse than useless. But in their primary role, 
they pave the way along which the world advances into novelty. Error is the price which we 
pay for progress. (PR: 187)11  
 
Within this paradigm, error is of (great) potential value. In the context of an actualized existential 
catastrophe, error in the approach to mitigating it is terminal. But errors regarding, for example, the 
course of its development, the question of “which one will get us first,” or the different factors in its 
concrescence, may all contribute to the population of a conceptual and affective picture of 
existential risk that may have diverse roles to play in our multi-modal attempts to mitigate it.12 Every 
proposition brings something new within our scope:  
 
When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has 
resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex predicate. A 
novelty has emerged into creation. The novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be 
good or bad. But it is new, a new type of individual, and not merely a new intensity of 
individual feeling. (PR: 187)  
 
                                                            
11 On this basis, we might also consider as a probably nonconformal proposition with potential value as “lure 
for feeling,” a version of Whitehead’s God that would still have some capacity for the salvation of actual 
humans; this was a possibility raised in relation to environmental catastrophe in the presentation at the 
conference in Claremont that became the germ of this paper (How Do You Make Yourself a Proposition? A 
Whitehead Laboratory, Dec 1-3, 2016). 
12 Equally, while propositions drawn from an ancient mythological text may have little to contribute to the 
challenge, for example, of developing “ecophagic devices” to counter a nanotechnological catastrophe (though 
who knows?), they might easily offer something of value to the challenge of designing “new institutions that 
can maintain and administer centralized global power without becoming oppressive”(and the possible 
blindspots in the thinking in such design that could unwittingly give rise to further threats) – two possible 
approaches to nanotechnology as a global catastrophic risk suggested by Phoenix and Treder (2008: 497-8). In 
a similar vein, while scientific and analytic research (including, at least in passing, some of the work on 
existential risk) often recognizes that science fiction provides useful imaginary descriptions of possible 
emergent or future technologies that could give rise to global catastrophic threats, such as robotics and AI 
(Isaac Asimov), the technological singularity (Vernor Vinge), or nanotechnology (Neal Stephenson), we should 
not neglect what these and other less scientifically detailed works of science fiction might offer to pragmatic 
efforts towards risk mitigation in the propositions they offer touching on ethics, politics, culture, modes of 
thinking and feeling, myth, and so on. 
This may be one general approach to tackling the problem described at the outset of this paper, of 
achieving the adaptive results of Bateson’s deutero-learning without the benefit of first-order trial-
and-error learning. This is a form of learning based on error without trial – on virtual error, or error 
as the general field of hypothetical possibilities from which actuality will continually emerge. It might 
be considered a cousin, as it were, of the species of thought experiment on which analytic thinking 
(including that of existential risk) often draws – but expanded to include feeling, error, uncertainty as 
valuable aspects of both the resource in question and the effects derived from it.  
On this basis, I would advocate mining the vast collection of cultural resources, both ancient 
and modern, relating to the theme of the end of the human, the form it takes and the ways humans 
and other beings respond, for propositions of potential value to the larger task of facing the 
challenge of existential risk, which is as much a psychological and cultural problem as it is a 
technoscientific one: in this sense, the conception of this project as multi- or transdisciplinary has 
not yet gone far enough. Even the most sceptic rationalist, one who deems such cultural resources 
as almost certainly irrelevant to this task, would accept, we might hope, that they have the potential 
capacity to help reduce existential risk by “one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point,” 
which, according to Bostrom’s calculation of the value of addressing existential risk at all, would be 
“worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives” (2013: 19). Furthermore, though 
such an undertaking might require significant time and effort, nevertheless considered in relation to 
projects such as enhancing international counterterrorism initiatives, implementing comprehensive 
biosecurity strategies, developing global systems for overseeing nanotechnology research, or 
building “Noah’s Ark” refuges13 and seed banks, such research has the extra advantage of being, to 
put it simply, cheap.  
We shouldn’t expect to be able to anticipate exactly what benefits might be derived from 
such research (any more than one does with a given scientific experiment, so long as a working 
                                                            
13 For a discussion, see Hanson (2008: 373-5). 
paradigm and reasonable hypothesis that useful findings are possible has been established). But 
undertaking the endeavour would in itself imply a slight loosening of the techno-scientific/rationalist 
bias prevalent in existential risk thinking to date (this is not to say that this bias is not for the most 
part sensible and efficacious; it is in what it risks excluding, rather than what it includes and 
prioritizes, that I find some cause for concern). But we can speculate that the value of this loosening 
is one effect into which, through a series of feedback loops, we might expect to gain further insight 
and understanding as such an endeavour is pursued. In particular, we should at least entertain the 
possibility that the long-term survival of humans in some or other (likely posthuman) form will 
ultimately depend upon our ability to let go, at least to some extent, of our fixation on precisely this 
goal of human survival, or at least our treatment of it as an absolute imperative, and our seeming 
dependence on instrumental means of achieving it. Indeed, who is to say that this is not the “Great 
Filter” that has been proposed as bringing about the extinction of complex, intelligent lifeforms 
elsewhere in the universe, such that we have not yet encountered them?14 Might it not be that the 
fixation of advanced technological societies or species on the scientific rationality and technological 
reasoning that they credit with having got them there, is precisely what repeatedly leads to their 
(self-)destruction through the (mis-)use of their technological accomplishments? This may very well 
not be the case; but it is a possibility that at least deserves to be included in our attempts to think 
about how to think about existential risk.   
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